In the span of a single week, the Supreme Court of Mauritius has rejected four separate applications for conditional leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC), each for distinct reasons. These rulings serve as a stark reminder that appeals to the JCPC are far from automatic and remain strictly governed by constitutional and procedural requirements. However, they also raise important questions about whether the strict approach taken by the Supreme Court is truly serving the interests of justice or merely reinforcing procedural barriers.

In Troylukho JC v The District Council of Black River & Anor [2025 SCJ 75] in which we successfully assisted one of the Respondents, the Court denied leave as the matter did not raise a question of great general or public importance. The applicant had sought judicial review of a building permit decision but the Court found that he had failed to establish an arguable case. Additionally, the Court found that the judicial review application had been misconceived from the outset, rendering the appeal application untenable under section 81(2)(a) of the Constitution. While this decision reflects the Court’s role in preventing frivolous litigation from reaching the JCPC, it also raises concerns about access to justice in public law matters, particularly when environmental and planning issues are involved.

In Ramnauth M v The State of Mauritius [2025 SCJ 83], the Supreme Court refused leave based on a fundamental procedural defect. The applicant, seeking to challenge his conviction for driving under the influence, failed to specify under which section of the Constitution his application was made. The Court emphasized that for an appeal as of right under section 81(1)(a), the applicant must clearly outline the constitutional provision requiring interpretation—an obligation that was not met. Despite the applicant’s claim that his right to a fair trial had been breached, the Court’s strict adherence to procedural formalities effectively shut the door on further appeal.

In Mauritius Revenue Authority v Smit Salvage Pte Ltd & Anor [2025 SCJ 80], the Court refused leave on the ground that the impugned judgment was not a "final decision." The case involved a tax dispute where the Supreme Court had ruled in favor of Smit Salvage, quashing a decision of the Assessment Review Committee (ARC) and remitting the matter back for determination on the merits. The Court held that because the dispute had not been finally resolved and was still pending before the ARC, the decision was interlocutory rather than final, making it ineligible for appeal under section 81(2)(a). This decision highlights the challenges faced by parties seeking to challenge procedural rulings that have significant implications for the ultimate outcome of a case.

Finally, in Bay Capital Investments Ltd v Harry Hassomal Mohinani [2025 SCJ 78], leave was refused on the ground that the decision in question was not a "final decision" within the meaning of section 81(1)(b) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled that the granting of leave for a derivative action was merely a procedural step and did not determine the substantive rights of the parties, thus failing both the “application test” and the “order test” for finality. This decision reinforces the difficulty of appealing interlocutory decisions, even when they may have significant implications for corporate governance and shareholder rights.

These four judgments underline that access to the JCPC remains subject to stringent legal thresholds. Whilst there is a need not to allow weak or poorly framed appeals to reach the JCPC, it also raises broader concerns. Is the strict application of procedural rules truly ensuring justice, or is it merely limiting litigants’ ability to have their cases heard at the highest level? The balance between judicial efficiency and access to justice remains a delicate one, and these recent decisions highlight the continuing tension between these competing objectives.